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The Hidden Dilemmas in Software Development Project Decision-
making: Persist or Desist? 
 
Gary Pan 





Given that decision makers continue to face dilemmas on whether to persist or desist with 
troubled projects, it is important for senior managers to support the assessment of 
decision dilemmas faced by project managers. By drawing on two case studies that 
exhibit project escalation situation, decision-makers in both cases were interviewed and 
important documents reviewed, the paper has identified five types of decision dilemmas 
and their associated characteristics: justification, sunk cost, ambiguity, opportunity cost 
and completion. The decision dilemmas identified in this study and the recommendations 
for countering these dilemmas aim to help project managers improve the process of 
decision-making during project development. Furthermore, it is also important for 
organizations to be aware of the role played by decision dilemmas within the escalation 
phenomenon as such understanding could help organizations extricate themselves from 
future escalation predicaments.  
 






Most research on information systems (IS) development has sought to understand why 
commitment to projects escalates (e.g., Keil, 1995) and how to reduce commitment to 
troubled projects (e.g., Montealegre and Keil, 2000). Despite this progress, escalation still 
occurs with high frequency among IS projects (Pan et al., 2006). One major issue is that 
IS project managers do not pay enough attention to how much uncertainty surrounding 
decision-making could affect project outcomes. In fact, making decisions on whether to 
persist or desist with a troubled project is extremely difficult for project managers. 
Continuing commitment in such projects may lead to huge losses of valuable resources 
(Drummond, 1996; Keil, 1995). Therefore, breaking escalation cycles as early as possible 
seems to be the key to reducing or discontinuing the commitment to these troubled 
projects (Keil and Robey, 1999). Nevertheless, the timing of when to break such 
escalation cycles seems ambiguous. After all, how many of these warning signals are 
genuinely ‘fatal’ to IS projects and besides, any premature de-escalation may also lead to 
unnecessary waste of resources. The ambiguity arises mainly because in many 
organizational settings where decision situations are ill-structured (Hammond et al., 
2006), decision makers are often compelled to ‘play their cards and take their chances’ 
(Staw and Ross, 1978). Many project decisions are made in the face of very difficult 
dilemmas and uncertainty plays a significant role in such project decision situations. 
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Therefore, it is imperative to unravel the nature of the hidden dilemmas faced by project 
decision makers and to identify a comprehensive set of remedial actions as a basis for 
decreasing the uncertainty surrounding decision making during project development. 
Therefore the goal of this paper is to identify the nature of the hidden dilemmas in 
project decision-making and the conditions that contribute to these dilemmas. 
 
2. Theoretical Foundation 
Escalation of commitment is a phenomenon that refers to situations where decision 
makers commit additional resources to a failing course of action (Staw and Ross, 1978). 
Drummond (1996) characterises escalation as why organizations seem to persist with 
failing ventures long after any sensible person would surely have given up. Keil (1995) 
considers project escalation to occur when there is continued commitment and negative 
information. Organizations apparently keep investing additional resources in failing IS 
projects in an attempt to make them work, and consequently these ‘troubled’ projects are 
continued even though it may make more economic sense to stop them (Newman and 
Sabherwal, 1996). According to Keil and Mann (1997), at least 30% of all IS projects 
exhibit some degree of escalation. Well-known examples may include, the Taurus project 
at the London Stock Exchange (Drummond, 1996), and the baggage handling system at 
the Denver International Airport (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). The alarming data 
suggest that IS managers are doing a poor job in identifying or terminating projects that 
are likely to fail.  
 
Previous research suggests that escalation is a complex phenomenon that may be 
influenced by many different factors. Staw and Ross (1987) group these factors into four 
categories: project, psychological, social and organizational. These factors have been 
used widely in experimental-based studies (Sabherwal et al., 2002) and case studies 
(Keil, 1995; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996) to understand the escalation phenomenon in 
IS settings. In their study, Newman and Sabherwal (1996) examined a case of escalation 
of commitment to an IS development project at an organization called CENTCO. They 
found that “project and structural determinants are crucial in obtaining initial 
commitment for the IS project, social and structural determinants influence whether 
commitment to the project is withdrawn, and psychological and project determinants 
influence escalation of commitment” (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996, p.45). In Keil’s 
(1995) study, he found three factors that had not been widely discussed in the escalation 
literature: ‘emotional attachment to the project’, ‘empire building’ and ‘slack resources 
and loose management controls’. Sabherwal et al (2002) examined the effects of project, 
psychological, social and structural factors during four stages of an IS project. Their 
results support escalation in IS projects. Moreover, project factors and psychological 
factors, but not structural factors, seem to aid escalation. Project, psychological, and 
social factors also have different effects during various stages of the development.  
 
 
To reduce the effect of escalation, experts have advocated de-escalation to break such 
escalation cycles. Through de-escalation, troubled projects may be successfully turned 
around or sensibly abandoned (Keil and Robey, 1999). Despite the useful advice, the 
timing of when to trigger de-escalation remains ambiguous. Early escalation studies 
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suggest that the escalation phenomenon represents a syndrome of decision dilemma 
caused by the interplay between the degree of commitment to a course of action and the 
amount of equivocality perceived in the feedback on prior investments and in 
expectations for the future (Bowen, 1987). There are occasions in IS development 
projects which a decision has to be made on continuing the project, which is associated 
with certain costs, or cancelling it, and the consequences of either action seem uncertain 
(Mann, 1996). Although, escalation involves resource commitment in the face of negative 
interim outcomes, the eventual outcomes may or may not be negative. It is no wonder 
that Keil (1995) termed such decision dilemmas as one of the most difficult management 
issues that can arise in connection with IS projects. In summary, the review of the IS 
development literature suggests that existing escalation studies have paid little attention 
to what these decision dilemmas are and how they could affect project decision-making 
during project development. It is therefore the aim of this paper to address the gap in the 
escalation literature. 
 
3. Research Approach 
 
Two case studies were conducted for the purpose of this study (Klein and Myers, 1999). 
The case study approach is adopted as it allows for the better capturing of the 
organizational dynamics of a phenomenon (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996). The two 
cases were selected for study because the project escalation experiences they exhibit offer 
valuable examples of the escalation phenomenon. The first case study was conducted in 
an UK local government organization, BMBC (a pseudonym) which proposed an e-
procurement system as part of its e-government initiative. From June 2002 to August 
2002, interviews were conducted with the IS project manager, seven steering committee 
members and the e-Envoy1 . The second case study was conducted in a large utility 
company in the UK, British Utilities (pseudonym), which proposed a queue removal 
system as part of its effort to remove long queues of customers calling its billing and 
customer service lines. Data were collected from November 2002 – March 2003. 
Altogether two project managers, two senior directors and four IS committee members 
were interviewed. These interviewees were selected as they all had direct influences on 
the decisions to persist or desist with the two projects. Primarily, semi-structured 
interviews and informal discussions were conducted with all relevant project decision-
makers. These semi-structured interviews were tape-recorded with the interviewees’ 
permission and transcribed immediately after the meetings. Each interview lasted an 
average of one and a half hours. Secondary data such as reports, memorandums and 
meeting minutes were also gathered to supplement the information collected through 
interviews. Each decision maker was asked: During the project development, did he/she 
ever feel uncertain about the prospect of the project and face any decision dilemma? If 
the interviewees answered yes (which they all did), the researcher followed it up by 
asking them to identify and describe these decision dilemmas. The researcher was 
particularly interested in finding out the nature of the decision dilemmas and their 
contributory conditions.  
 
                                                 
1 An e-Envoy is the representative of the local council at the central government’s e-government committee. 
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As a first step in the data analysis, the researcher analyzed the coded transcripts and 
secondary data, and created a detailed history of the project in narrative form. After 
validating the events with several individuals who were familiar with the project’s history, 
the researcher identified portions of the text directly related to the decision dilemmas, and 
described what these dilemmas and their contributing conditions were. To reduce the 
researcher bias, the project information and interview transcripts were shown to a senior 
colleague who was uninvolved in the project. The role of this senior colleague was to 
“bring a different and possibly more objective eye to the evidence” (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p.538). The information he received did not include the researcher’s list of identified 
decision dilemmas and their contributory conditions. After that, the researcher and the 
senior colleague met to compare their individual lists. In cases where it was difficult to 
categorize, the researcher used his own judgment to assign the dilemma category that 
seemed to best fit the information presented. Finally, the decision dilemmas and 
contributing conditions were compared and contrasted against the array of factors 
identified in the IS literature as contributory to project escalation. The entire data analysis 
process went through numerous iterations (Klein and Myers, 1999) so that a coherent and 
consistent overview of the case organizations could be formulated. 
 
4. Case Description 
 
The BMBC Case 
 
BMBC is a UK local government organization that proposed an e-procurement system as 
part of its e-government initiative. The project costing £150, 000, started in January 2001 
and planned to complete by December 2001. The organization aimed to be the first local 
government organization to purchase its goods and services online. The project was 
headed by the IS manager, who was overseen by a steering committee and an e-Envoy 
who represented BMBC in the central government’s e-government committee. An 
external software vendor was tasked with developing the software. During design and 
testing, the project stalled due to a disagreement between the users and the vendor over 
several design requirements. The contractor demanded an additional £150, 000 for the 
additional changes. The users refused as they viewed those changes as alterations 
necessitated by the contractor’s mistakes. However, the steering committee agreed to the 
payment and continued the project. According to one of the IS committee members:  
 
“The users had repeatedly complained about the low 
quality of the software and the failure of the IS contractor 
to understand their requirements. On the other hand, the IS 
contractor also expressed dissatisfaction with the users for 
frequent changing the requirements. The situation became 
ambiguous and complex with regards to which party was 
really at fault and what action we ought to take.”  
 
 
The project did not continue for much longer before the same problems resurfaced and 
resulted in one of the users blowing the whistle on the project, and reporting it to the e-
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Envoy. The IS project manager revealed that the users were resolute about project 
abandonment:  
“I faced a lot of pressures from the users. But how could I 
give up? With all the resources invested, the option of 
reverting to buying packaged software was unimaginable”. 
 
Given the importance of the project, the e-Envoy intervened and stated that the project 
had to continue. According to the e-Envoy: 
 
“The project was clearly having problems. But I did 
promise the central government that we could achieve it”. 
 
Several problems were identified, which led to the project team exploring alternative 
courses of action. The e-Envoy commented:  
 
“Before an alternative action plan was developed, there was 
a lot of confusion. I was unsure if we could turn it around. 
But the project was critical to us and I had to take my 
chances by asking the project members to continue even 
though it had reached a point where most of them had 
given up.” 
 
One of the steering committee members commented:  
 
“We lacked faith in the turnaround effort. Some of us were 
thinking of investing in new packaged software which was 
cheaper than the additional investment needed for the 
system improvement effort.” 
 
Eventually, the project team proposed a reduction of project scope without causing 
significant changes to the original specification. The e-Envoy admitted:  
 
“Even though some committee members informed me of 
several problems arising, I simply told them that we were 
very close and it was too late to give up.”  
 
To obtain stakeholder buy-in, the e-Envoy influenced all constituencies to support the 
turnaround strategies before rolling them out. The IS project manager also commented:  
 
“With only three departments instead of the entire 
organization, and with the project divided into many stages, 
all of us felt confident that the completion of the first stage 
was within our reach.” 
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All changes were implemented and they produced good results. When the first phase of 
the e-procurement system finally went live in August 2002, the project was eight months 
behind schedule and close to £200, 000 over its original budget. 
 
The British Utilities Case 
 
British Utilities is a large utility company in the UK that proposed a queue removal 
system as part of its effort to remove long queues of customers calling its billing and 
customer service lines. The project started in May 2001 and was expected to roll out after 
one year. The initial budget for the project was £1 million. The project was headed by a 
project manager and supervised by an IS committee. The project suffered several delays 
due to the departure of several key project executives during its development. According 
to one of the senior directors:  
 
“There was huge ambiguity in the project after the project 
champion left the project team. Exactly, who was to take 
over? Also, whether the system could really solve the long 
queue problem and maybe we should consider other 
options?” 
 
Every change of new project managers would initiate the process of recruiting new 
project members. This had caused the project to drift for a relatively long period. 
Furthermore, each change would bring about several new changes to the proposed 
system. All these problems required an additional investment of £750, 000 from the 
original budget. The IS project manager commented:  
 
“Many project members had doubts on whether further 
investment was necessary. It was a difficult decision for 
me. However, I insisted of having it since we had already 
invested so much.”  
 
The senior director who was also the subsequent project champion supported the 
additional investment. One of the committee members agreed that the project team was 
eager to complete the project:  
 
“The senior director had wanted the project to continue 
until it was completed. He wanted to see it through since he 
believed that the project development wouldn’t be far away 
from the end-point.” 
 
 “What were we going to tell everybody if the project did 
not succeed? It had to go on. I wanted to prove that my 
original decision was right. After all I was always right in 
previous decisions.”   
 
The project was used as publicity to demonstrate that the company was working towards 
improving its customer service. Nevertheless, the project was eventually abandoned in 
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August 2002 due to a sudden sharp decrease in call queues and also the detection of a 
deficiency within the system which made the system redundant. According to one of the 
committee members:  
 
“Instead of further investment to improve the system, the 
opportunity cost issue triggered a decision by the top 
management to invest in a fully fledged CRM system that 
would provide a total customer relationship management 
solution. The queue removal system could not fulfill the 





The findings from the two case studies concur with the notion that there are occasions in 
IS projects which a decision has to be made on continuing the project or cancelling it, 
with the consequences of either action seem uncertain (Keil, 1995). Five hidden 
dilemmas in project decision-making and their characteristics are discussed below.  
 
The Justification Dilemma  
Based on the theory of cognitive dissonance, self-justification theory attributes escalation 
to the reluctance of managers to admit, to themselves or to others, that previous resource 
allocations were unwise. Individuals seek to rationalize their previous behavior against a 
perceived error in judgment (Brockner 1992). Central to the concept, psychological self-
justification is the notion of personal responsibility. Presumably, a decision maker with a 
high degree of personal responsibility for a previously chosen course of action will feel 
greater need to justify the initial resource allocation decision (Staw and Ross, 1978). In 
both cases, the decision makers felt compelled to justify their prior decisions to prove 
themselves to external constituents and themselves despite having negative project 
feedbacks. For example, the e-Envoy in the BMBC case admitted having justification 
dilemma to continue the project even though it was clearly in trouble. The e-Envoy took 
it upon himself to successfully deliver the project so as to justify to the expectations of 
the central government and the public. In the British Utilities case, the senior director was 
eager to prove to his colleagues and subordinates that his original decision was right 
despite negative feedbacks and as a result, continued his commitment in the project. His 
behaviour of continuing the cycle of committing resources, problems and further 
commitment to justify previous decisions constituted escalation. 
 
The Sunk Cost Dilemma  
When deciding between cancelling a failing project and escalating commitment to the 
project, individuals may take sunk costs, representing an irrevocable investment of 
resources that should be irrelevant in decision-making because the past cannot be 
changed, into consideration (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Whyte (1986) suggests that 
sunk costs may influence decision makers to adopt a negative frame, thereby promoting 
risk seeking behaviour which can be observed as escalating commitment to a failing 
course of action. In the cases of BMBC and British Utilities, decision makers faced the 
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dilemmas of whether they ought to include the dollar amount that has been expended into 
the decision making process (Keil et al., 2000). For example, the IS project manager 
faced lots of pressures from users who were resolute about project abandonment. 
However with all the resources invested, he was reluctant to revert to buying packaged 
software. Similarly in the British Utilities case, the IS project manager had faced a very 
difficult decision since many project members had doubts on whether further investment 
was necessary. But eventually, he decided to continue despite negative feedbacks because 
lots of resources had already been invested. 
 
The Ambiguity Dilemma   
In an ambiguous situation, the tendency to escalate commitment is attributed to a variety 
of motives, including economic considerations, i.e. a belief that further resources 
commitment is economically prudent, curiosity and a desire to learn more about the 
phenomenon, and the need to make additional effort to examine if it will produce positive 
results (Bowen, 1987). In both cases, decision makers faced the dilemmas of whether to 
continue a project because of the ambiguous situations in which past performance 
information was equivocal and did not clearly indicate failure. In the BMBC case, several 
interviewees reported facing the ambiguity dilemma during project development. For 
example, the IS project manager highlighted the disagreement between the users and the 
IS contractor in which the situation became ambiguous and complex as to which party 
was really at fault and what action the project manager ought to have taken. Furthermore 
before the alternative action plan was developed, there was a lot of confusion and many 
committee members were unsure if they could turn it around. But the project was too 
critical and the e-Envoy was forced to take considerable risks by asking the project 
members to continue even though it had reached a point where most of them had given 
up. Similarly, in the British Utilities case, the senior director indicated the presence of 
ambiguity dilemma during the project development especially after the project champion 
left the project team. Basically whether the system could really solve the long queue 
problem and whether they ought to consider other options were totally unclear. 
 
The Opportunity Cost Dilemma  
In some project situations, opportunity cost may be incurred for investing in a project 
turnaround rather than a new project (Northcraft and Neale, 1986). In both cases, decision 
makers faced the dilemmas of whether to continue a project due to the opportunity cost 
incurred in investing in the project turnaround rather than in a new project. For example 
in the BMBC case, many committee members faced the opportunity cost dilemma since 
they lacked the confidence that the turnaround effort would work as some of them were 
even contemplating investing in new packaged software which was cheaper than the 
additional investment needed for the system improvement effort. Likewise, in the case of 
British Utilities, the opportunity cost issue triggered the top management’s decision to 
invest in a fully fledged CRM system that would provide a total customer relationship 
management solution. Apparently, the queue removal system could not fulfill the 
strategic needs of the company and justify the additional investment. 
 
The Completion Dilemma  
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One of the key driving forces that can encourage escalation is the proximity to the goal, 
or what is sometimes labelled the completion effect (Conlon and Garland, 1993). The 
completion effect which is derived from the approach-avoidance theory, suggests that the 
desire to achieve task closure or completion can have a significant influence on behavior 
(Katz and Kahn, 1966). This view is also consistent with early work on escalation 
conducted by Brockner et al. (1979, p.194), who observed that an individual’s motivation 
for pursuing a course of action may shift over time “due in part to the presumed increased 
proximity to the goal”. In both cases, decision makers faced the dilemmas of whether to 
continue a project based on the desire to achieve task completion. For example, the e-
Envoy in the BMBC case recognized the completion dilemma over the project as he 
simply ignored the committee members’ negative feedbacks and continued the project 
based on the close proximity to completion. In addition, with the new alternative plan, the 
project members were determined to complete the project as they felt that the end-point 
was in sight. Similarly, the project team in the British Utilities case was eager to 
complete the project. For example, the senior director had insisted on completing the 
project as he believed that the project development was towards completion. Various 





Justification   Decision makers face the dilemma of whether to persist with a troubled 
project so as to demonstrate the validity of those earlier decisions. 
Sunk Cost  Decision makers face the dilemma of whether to persist with a troubled 
project because of what has been already spent when the economically 
rational action is to quit. 
Ambiguity  Decision makers face the dilemma of whether to persist with a troubled 
project in the situation where information on past performance is equivocal 
and does not clearly indicate failure. 
Opportunity 
Cost  
Decision makers face the dilemma of whether to persist with a troubled 
project based on the opportunity cost incurred in investing in a project 
turnaround rather than a new project. 
Completion  Decision makers face the dilemma of whether to persist with a troubled 
project due to the desire to achieve task completion. 
Table 1: Five Major Types of Decision Dilemmas Faced by Project Decision-makers in 
BMBC and British Utilities 
 
6. Implications and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of the 
hidden dilemmas in project decision-making during IS project development. By drawing 
on two case studies that exhibit project escalation situation, conducting subsequent 
interviews with decision-makers in both cases and reviewing important documents, the 
paper has identified various types of decision dilemmas and their associated 
characteristics faced by project decision-makers. This study has made several 
contributions to research and practice. For research, this research represents one of the 
first studies to explore the types of dilemmas and their characteristics faced by decision-
makers during project escalation situations. Until now, decision dilemmas have been 
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recognized as prevalent in project escalation settings but little is known about what they 
are and how they are like. For practitioners, this study develops a comprehensive set of 
remedial actions as the basis for decreasing uncertainty in decision making during project 
development. For instance, to counter the justification dilemma, the first option would be 
to reduce the desire for self-justification. This could be achieved by having a group 
decision making mechanism so as to diffuse individual responsibility. Individuals who 
initially approve a project should be separated from the group that evaluates its progress 
later on. Managers should also consider lessening the severity of penalties for failure so 
that the fear of failure would not trigger a strong desire for self-justification. To counter 
the sunk cost effect, project executives should honestly ask themselves whether they 
would choose the same course of action that they have taken if there had been no past 
investments. They should seek out and listen to the views of people who were uninvolved 
in the original choice and be alert to sunk cost bias in the recommendations made by 
others. To minimize ambiguity dilemma, it would be prudent for project executives to re-
examine their assumptions during project development. Before further commitment of 
valuable resources (e.g., time, manpower and funds), managers ought to re-examine the 
original project assumptions and ensure that these assumptions have not changed. To 
resolve the opportunity cost dilemma, one key option would be to set minimum rate of 
return targets, often referred to as project hurdle rates. Project hurdle rates provide 
objective points of reference against which managers can judge whether a project is 
economically acceptable to their organization at a given point of project development and 
whether alternative investment should be considered. Finally, to counter the completion 
dilemma, one option is to promote regular reconsideration of the project instead of 
emphasizing project completion. Project completion may be deemphasized so that 
attention may be drawn to whether the objectives of the project have been met along the 
development path. The recommendations for decreasing uncertainty in decision-making 





Justification    Reduce the desire for self-justification by separating initial and subsequent 
project decision making. Use group rather than individual decision making 
mechanisms. Reduce the severity of penalties for failure.  
Sunk Cost  Advise decision makers to disregard the level of sunk cost when deciding 
whether to continue a project. Encourage decision makers to set spending 
limits and make available alternative projects for investment. 
Ambiguity  Know the stage of the project and manage accordingly. Assess risks early (and 
often) during the development process. Conduct serious project audits. 
Opportunity 
Cost  
Set minimum rate of return targets. Consider what the objectives are and 
whether they are best served by the status quo or an alternative course of 
action. 
Completion  Promote regular reconsideration of the project instead of emphasizing 
completion of the project. Reward project executives based on project 
management processes rather than project completion. 
Table 2: Recommendations for Decreasing Uncertainty in Decision-making during 
Project Development 
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